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Regulated markets and state-owned monopolies characterized the economies of many 
Southern European territories around the end of the Middle Ages and during the  
Renaissance. Although this economic form was of considerable importance in implementing 
public policy at the time, investigation into the functioning of cost accounting in such 
contexts has been consistently neglected in accounting research. In this paper, we examine 
the role of cost systems in  early regulated markets by focusing on the case of the soap 
production and distribution  monopoly in the City of Seville, Spain. In 1423, the King of 
Castille granted the soap monopoly to the Duke of Alcalá as a reward for his war 
achievements, but pricing decisions rested in the hands of the local government. Disputes 
between the Duke of Alcalá and the local government (the parties) about the fair price of a 
pound of soap were negotiated after the development of tests that replicated the soap 
production process and determined its cost through complex calculations. 
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th  century organizations has enhanced extant knowledge about the 
role of early cost systems in the public sector and of firms operating under monopolistic 
conditions (Hoskin and Macve, 1986, 1988; Carmona, Ezzamel and Gutiérrez, 2002).  
However, the limited i ntersection between the time span and the focal settings of these 
investigations has restricted the diversity of issues under investigation and constrained 
research advancements in this area (Meyer, 1986). Paraphrasing Scott (1995: 146), it would 
be difficult, if not impossible, to discern the causes and consequences of the implementation 
of early cost accounting systems if all our cases were embedded in the same or similar 
contexts. Therefore, different strands of historical research in management accounting 
concur that we still have much to learn about the extent to which early cost systems met the 
demands of organizational objectives in varying circumstances (the Economics-Based 
School: Boyns and Edwards, 1997b; the Foucaldian School: Hoskin and Macve, 2000). In 
particular, we argue that an examination of the ways in which cost calculations mediated the 
enforcement of monopolies and regulated markets in many Southern European territories 
during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance could augment our understanding of the role 
of such systems in mature, 19
th and 20
th century public sector organizations (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1995;  Carmona and Macías, 2001) and the interrelationship between accounting 
and the state during the Renaissance (Miller, 1990). 
 
Archival evidence supporting this investigation is gathered from the Royal Soap Factory 
of Seville ( Reales Almonas de Sevilla  – RAS)
1, which from 1423 to 1811
2 enjoyed the 
royal privilege of being the sole producer and purveyor of soap to the City of Seville, 
Spain. The royal decree that granted this monopoly also established that the price of soap 
should be set by the local government of Seville. In these circumstances, the RAS and the 
local government (hereafter called “the parties”) became enmeshed in disagreements about 
the fair price of soap. These disputes were negotiated around ad-hoc tests that replicated 
the production process of soap and aimed at tracking its manufacturing and administrative 
costs through complex calculations. Our investigation draws on primary evidence about 
the tests that were conducted in the 16
th and 17
th centuries and on extensive 
correspondence among the RAS, the local government of Seville, and the Royal House.   
 
This article may be of interest to readers for at least two reasons: 1) its treatment of a 
neglected issue in the history of accounting and 2) its institutional sociological 
perspective, which places cost accounting at the interface of business organizations and 
the state. 
 
                                                 
 
1 Archival evidence comes from the Archivo Ducal de Medinaceli, Seccción de Alcalá (Archive of the 
Dukedom of Medinaceli, Alcalá Section – ADMSA) and the Archivo Municipal de Sevilla (The Municipal 
Archive of Seville – AMS). We have also gathered primary data on some aspects of the wider contexts of 
our investigation from the  Archivo General de Indias  (The General Archive of Indies – AGI).  The 
archives are well preserved and free access is provided to researchers. Fortunately, ADMSA and AMS are 
specialized archives that contain records of the perspectives of the RAS and the local government of 
Seville, thereby enabling us to cross-check the consistency and reliability of our data sources. The archives 
do not contain information on the overall financial accounting system of the RAS, and it is therefore 
impossible to determine the firm’s profits during our observation period.   
2 The soap monopoly lasted until August 6, 1811, when the  Spanish Parliament abolished private 
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First, we approach the environmental circumstances that witnessed the functioning of 
cost accounting in a setting (i.e., early regulated markets in Southern Europe) and a time 
(i.e., the 16
th to 17
th centuries) that has been consistently neglected by accounting 
historians. By doing so, we expect t o enhance understanding about the technical and 
discursive natures of cost calculations and their role in enforcing public policy at the 
outset of regulated markets. In particular, we aim at elucidating the role of cost 
accounting in a monopoly that was originally granted, not to signal recognition for 
efficient management, but to express royal gratitude for war achievements.  
 
Second, we draw on the contributions of institutional sociology to render visible the 
functioning of cost accounting in the interface of business organizations and the state, an 
area that is considered to be promising within this stream of research (Meyer, 1986: 
355). In the case of the monopoly on the production and distribution of soap, cost 
calculations became one of the bases for  negotiating the price of this public good and a 
platform for the parties’ active attempts at manipulating the price of soap in their favor. 
Through this investigation we focus explicit attention to a neglected area in institutional 
theory:  the role of human and organizational agency in the establishment and 
development of societal norms (DiMaggio, 1988; Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002). As 
noted by Carruthers (1995: 324), organizations frequently play an active role in the 
construction of norms and beliefs or in the shaping of their application in particular 
instances. In this study, we focus on the contrast between behavior and intention: the 
behavior of the parties, which apparently accepted the test as a basis for resolving their 
disputes on the price o f soap; and their  intention of shaping, for their own benefit, the 
particulars of the tests and their concomitant cost calculations.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section addresses concepts 
in the new institutional sociology that are useful in explaining our findings. We then 
examine the wider political and social contexts that witnessed the events under 
investigation and present the historical background of the soap business in the City of 
Seville. The next two sections describe the specifics of the tests, particularly by focusing 
on cost calculations and their role in price setting. Two of the tests that were carried out 
during our observation period (1525-1692) are examined in detail. We first address the 
1525 test, which depicts a case of materials that were newly purchased specifically for 
the test; and continue with a description of the tests conducted in 1615 that illustrate a 
case in which the parties used newly purchased materials as well as those taken from the 
RAS  warehouse inventory. In the following section, we examine the role of tests and 
cost calculations in price setting during the period 1640-1692. Findings are discussed in 
the final section, which establishes the limitations of this study and suggests further 
research in the area.  
 
INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND LEGITIMACY 
A central tenet of institutional sociology is that organizational contexts are 
“characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual 
organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy” (Scott and 
Meyer, 1983: 149). Rules and requirements to which organizations should conform are 
known as institutions. Organizations that conform to institutions avoid external claims of 
irrationality and negligible behavior. For example, there are pressures on modern 
organizations to increase quality across their value chain. In response to these demands, IE Working Paper                                WP 16 / 03                                    27 / 10 / 2003 
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firms create quality departments to plan and execute quality management and because i t 
is particularly  important to convey the appearance of a quality commitment to external 
parties such as customers, accreditation agencies, and the public at large.  As noted by 
institutional sociologists, “being technically efficient is not the only path to 
organizational  survival. Achieving legitimacy in the eyes of the world, state, powerful 
professions, or society at large, is another effective survival strategy” (Carruthers, 1995: 
317).  Legitimacy is defined as “the generalized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). Deephouse 
(1996: 1025) identifies two types of legitimacy:  regulatory endorsement, the acceptance 
of an organization by the state agencies that formally regulate it; and  public 
endorsement, the acceptance of an organization by the general public. 
 
Firms deploy active agency in their pursuit of legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Scott, 1987). As noted b y DiMaggio (1988: 15), “recruiting or creating an environment 
that can enact their claims is the central task that institutionalized entrepreneurs face in 
carrying out a successful institutionalization project.” Thus, interested parties lobby 
before the legislature to influence the content of bills, and within firms, managers, can 
exert active agency to the extent of  their latitude in manipulating their external 
environment (Oliver, 1991). The organizational deployment of legitimacy-building 
strategies involves “(a) efforts to  conform to the dictates of preexisting audiences within 
the organization’s current environment, (b) efforts to  select  among multiple 
environments in pursuit of an audience that will support current practices, and (c) efforts 
to  manipulate environmental structure by creating new audiences and new legitimating 
beliefs” (Suchman, 1995: 587,). A common characteristic of these strategies is the 
striving of institutional entrepreneurs to make a case for the technical nature of rules and 
norms (Scott and Meyer, 1991: 124) in an attempt to maintain an appearance of 
rationality (Carruthers, 1995: 315). In this respect, institutional theorists depict cost 
accounting calculations like  technical tools that are seen to engender legitimacy 
(Dirsmith, 1986: 358; also Meyer, 1986).  
 




th centuries – our period of observation  – the House of Habsburg 
reigned in Spain and over a vast number of territories in Europe, Latin America, and 
Asia. The Spanish empire’s mode of governance during the 16
th and 17
th centuries was 
greatly influenced by the imprint of King Philip II (1527-1598), who reigned from 1556 
to 1598 (Lynch, 1997). Philip II conceived of the state as a centralist and bureaucratic 
organization in which decisions were made at the top of the hierarchy  – by the King or 
his Royal Council  – after examination of documentary support. Therefore, Philip II 
preferred to write and read rather than discuss; as he once said in a royal hearing, “Don 
Alonso, talk  to me in writing” (Kamen, 1997: 235). This penchant for written documents 
made him known the “king of paperwork” (Kamen, 1997: 225), an attitude that slowed 
the decision-making process within the Spanish state at a time when its expansion and 
growth required flexibility and dynamism (Vázquez de Prada, 1990: 41). As he stated in 
his deeds, Philip II believed himself to be entrusted with absolute power (Kamen, 1997: 
225), a conviction that led him to believe that he was accountable only to God. This IE Working Paper                                WP 16 / 03                                    27 / 10 / 2003 
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perspective, along his idiosyncratic sense of justice, resulted in “guile and bloody 
despotism” (Lynch, 1997: 25). 
 
Philip II was an extremely pious person. In a letter written in 1566 to his ambassador in 
Rome, he said: “You may assure His Holiness that rather than suffer the least damage to 
religion and the service of God, I would lose all my states and an hundred lives, if I had 
them; for I do not propose nor desire to be the ruler of heretics” ( Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, 1994). Accordingly, Philip II made every  effort to support the pervasion of 
the Catholic Church over the civil and political spheres of life. To ensure that his goal 
was achieved, he reinforced the supervisory gaze and scope of control of the Inquisition 
(Lynch, 1997). For the purposes of this paper and our examination of the role of cost 
accounting systems in regulated markets, it is interesting to note that Philip II 
incorporated into his vision of the economy the dictates of the Schoolmen:  “those who 
govern the state must determine the just measure of things saleable …  it is not lawful to 
disregard such measures as are established by public authority or custom” (St. Thomas 
Aquinas,  1273: 320). In accordance with this doctrine, the Habsburgs  endorsed the 
policy of the Castillian kings during the Medieval Ages by deploying regulated markets 
to ensure the “just price” of goods (de Roover, 1967). Typically, public authorities set a 
price that was supposed to be equal to or slightly higher than the average cost of 
materials, for in Catholic Renaissance Spain the ideal of public service predominated 
over any ideals about private profit (Carmona and Donoso, 1999). Thus, the public 
policy of early regulated markets in Spain relied on considerations of what present-day 
terminology would label “rate-of-return regulation” (Laffont and Tirole, 1993: 13-19).  
 
The City  
On January 20, 1503, the Catholic kings granted the monopoly of Spanish trade with 
Latin America to the City of Seville through the enactment of the  Casa de la 
Contratación de Indias (House of Trade; see AGI. Sección Patronato. Legajo 25. Ramo 
1), a state-owned agency that acted as a board of trade, a commercial court, and a 
clearing house for American traffic and that masterminded and centralized the 
commerce of the metropolis with its overseas colonies (Piernas Hurtado, 1907; Donoso 
Anes, 1996). As consequence of this privilege, the city witnessed the inflow of exotic 
spices and precious metals from Latin America, making Seville a prosperous city, the 
commercial capital of Spain, and an extremely expensive place to live (Caballero 
Bonald, 1991). Morales Padrón (1977: 201) found, for example, that inflation in Seville 
increased by 107% between 1503 and 1550, a trend that continued for at least the next 
50 years.   The extent to which price increases may be solely attributed to the inflow of 
precious metals from Latin America is still a contentious issue in economic history, as 
some commentators argue that Seville’s high inflation may have been partly ascribed to 
the state’s high debt, the decrease in agricultural production during this period, and the 




th centuries, Seville was a city of contrasts. Its wealth attracted 
intellectuals, artists, and novelists who sought to make a living from the fortunes of 
private philanthropists, publishers, and the Catholic Church. Miguel de Cervantes, the 
author of  El Quixote, made many long visits to Seville in the 1560s and lived there 
between 1585 and 1601. Painters like Murillo, Valdés Leal, and Velázquez; writers like 
Mateo Alemán; and sculptors like Martínez Montañés, all of whom were born in Seville, IE Working Paper                                WP 16 / 03                                    27 / 10 / 2003 
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found in the city the sort of supportive environment that allowed them to develop their 
talents and to build a reputation that has lasted for centuries (Caballero Bonald, 1991). 
At the same time, Seville experienced steady demographic growth, as shown by a 
population increase from 55,000 inhabitants in 1533 to 121,505 in 1597 (Morales 
Padrón, 1975: 65). Unfortunately, this demographic explosion also resulted in huge 
pockets of poverty, and many people lived under miserable conditions (Morales Padrón, 
1975; Domínguez Ortiz, 1984). Entire neighborhoods were infested with bad odors and 
dirt, which fostered outbreaks of d isease in 1565-1568, 1580, 1599-1601, and 
particularly during 1648-1649 when the devastating Black Plague claimed a third of the 
population of Seville, including Martínez Montañés (Caballero Bonald, 1991; 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1994). The consumption of soap during this period could not 
be attributed to a personal taste for bathing, for soap was both a luxury and a poorly 
regarded social practice. As Philip II stated, personal bathing was a “not too Christian 
activity but a vicious tradition of Jews and  Moorish” (Caballero Bonald, 1991: 47). 
However, the physicians of the day recommended soap to fight disease.  As one said: 
“there is no better medicine (to tackle contagia) than a good laundry of the body” 
(ADMSA. Legajo 53-2). In 1525, when the population of Seville was 55,000, expected 
production of soap was 417,000 lbs (ADMSA. Legajo 51-4; AMS. Section 1, Litigios, 
Folder 116, Number 57) – an annual consumption of 7.6 pounds/person.  
 
THE SETTING 
In the Middle Ages, the City of Seville enjoyed the reputation of a   high-quality soap 
producer (González Moreno, 1975) for two reasons: the sophisticated process of soap 
production, as introduced by the Arabs during their occupation of the city between the 
8
th and the 13
th centuries
3; and the quality of raw materials utilized, especially the olive 
oil and ashes produced in the Guadalquivir Valley. It was customary for the kings of 
Castille to grant territories or monopolies over economic activities to members of the 
knighthood and the Catholic clergy who excelled in their services to the Crown through 
such activities as helping the Kingdom to reclaim Andalusia from the Arabs during the 
Middle Ages. Following this tradition, King  Enrique II issued a royal decree on May 23, 
1396, to grant the monopoly of soap production and distribution in the City of Seville to 
Archbishop  Ruy López-Dávalos (ADMSA.  Legajo 55-16). Until 1423, this royal 
privilege was extended or transferred to other individuals. At that time, King  Juan II 
expanded the privilege from the City of Seville to its entire area of influence and granted 
it to Admiral  Alonso Enríquez, who simultaneously received the Dukedom of Alcalá 
(ADMSA. Legajos 55-17 and 57-7). In this manner, the King expressed gratitude to the 
Duke for his war achievements, and the monopoly over soap production and distribution 
was extended to encompass the ashes used in its production.  As stated by King Enrique 
IV in a royal decree enacted in 1456: 
 
No one but the recipients of my royal privilege shall ever dare to produce ashes to 
make soap, with the exception of their employees, those having signed with them 
a lease contract, as well as those having obtained their consent … (ADMSA. 
Legajo 56-2).  
 
                                                 
3 Arab influence on the soap industry is illustrated by the adoption in ancient Spanish of the 




th centuries, the Dukedom of Alcalá deployed an active policy 
of acquiring olive trees and ash farms to ensure the supply of raw materials to the RAS 
and to deter smuggling (González Moreno, 1975). A search of the archives reveals, in 
fact, that the Dukedom of Alcalá filed extensive lawsuits against soap smugglers, in 
spite of the marginal significance of the illegal trade (ADMSA.  Legajos 50-26, 50-47, 
51-28; AMS. Section 1, Litigios, Folder 107, Number 3).  
 
The RAS was located in an impressive building surrounded by warehouses (González 
Moreno, 1975). The soap production and distribution processes were run by some 50 
employees and were characterized by tough working conditions. The heat of the soap 
production added to the usual high humidity and temperatures of Seville during five 
months of the year (86-104ºF or 30-40ºC), posing considerable difficulties over working 
conditions and requiring the operators to work naked: “… only inside the reduced space 
of the office of weights and measures is it possible to breathe” (ADMSA. Legajo  50-19)  
 
The royal decree that granted soap production and distribution privileges to the 
Dukedom of Alcalá (ADMSA. Legajos 55-17 and 57-7) stated that the local government 
should set the price of soap. Price changes in olive oil, ashes, or any other soap 
components caused frequent quarrels  between interested parties about the fair price of 
soap (González Moreno, 1975). As we shall see, such conflicts also involved the Royal 
House and usually involved the development of an  ensaye  – a test that replicated the 
soap production process in order to track the standard cost of production.  
 
Archival records refer to customary tradition at the time of addressing the governing 
rules of tests. However, our compilation of references to tradition in different primary 
documents, require us to concur with G onzález Moreno (1975) that the governing rules 
for tests were relatively strict. The parties negotiated to select a team of soap experts 
outside of Seville to conduct the tests. Their independence and neutrality was further 
guaranteed by the parties’ agreement to keep their contact with the experts to a 
minimum; in fact, the experts were not even allowed to overnight in the city during the 
testing period. A local judge supervised the tests and an accounting expert from the 
Catholic Church kept cost calculations and wrote the final report (ADMSA.  Legajos  
53-19). Tests were typically conducted on Saturdays, and the soap that was produced 
was stored in a sealed room until it solidified  – usually on the following Monday. The 
final product was weighed and the cost of a pound of soap was thereby determined. 
 
The date of the earliest test remains unclear. A 1675 document referred to the tests as 
“an operation that was being accomplished since the 15
th century by civil servants and 
the tenant of the soap factory, under royal authorization …” (ADMSA. Legajo 55-13). 
In a similar vein, the records of a test conducted in 1525 stated that the performance of 
olive oil in that test was far superior to that of any preceding test (ADMSA. Legajo 51-
4), suggesting that previous tests had already established a baseline. Our analysis of the 
extant archival evidence found no surviving records of tests until the period 1515-1520, 
and González Moreno (1975: 92) reports the development of a test in 1520. In 
summary, then, there are references in some primary documents to tests having been 
conducted during the 15
th century, but no concrete evidence of testing prior to 1520. 
 IE Working Paper                                WP 16 / 03                                    27 / 10 / 2003 
  7
As stated in the royal decree that granted the monopoly to the Dukedom of Alcalá, the 
price of soap was ultimately the responsibility of the local government (ADMSA. 
Legajos  55-17, 57-7). However, the Royal House sometimes interfered in such 
decisions at the request of the Duke. At a meeting held on August 23, 1483, the Council 
of Seville allowed the RAS to raise the price of a pound of soap from 6 to 7 maravedíes, 
because of reported cost increases in its basic components (ADMSA. Legajo  50-5). In 
1492, when the price of olive oil dropped, the local government decreased the price of 
soap from 7 to 5 maravedíes, but a royal decree revoked that decision (ADMSA. Legajo  
50-13). On August 13, 1515, the royal house forwarded a decree to the local 
government to set the soap price at 6 maravedíes.   
 
THE 1525 TEST 
In January, 1525, having observed that the price of soap was too high, the local 
government took the initiative to develop a test (ADMSA. Legajos 51-4, 53-27; AMS. 
Section 1,  Litigios, Folder  116, Number 57). Over the years there was a running 
argument between the Duke of Alcalá and the local government as to whether the tests 
should be run using raw materials from the RAS inventories as the Duke argued or if 
they there should be new materials purchased specifically for the purpose of testing.  In 
1525, the wishes of local government officials prevailed, and new materials were 
purchased. (see ADMSA. Legajo 51-4).  
 
Table 1: 
The 1525 Test: 
Cost of Raw Materials 
 
Materials  Consumption  Unit cost  Total cost 
Olive oil  3 arrobas
4  140.5 maravedíes
5  421.5 maravedíes 
Ashes  6 fanegas
6  50 maravedíes  300 maravedíes 
Lime  2 ½ fanegas  39 maravedíes  97,5 maravedíes 
Wood  1 carga  68 maravedíes  61 maravedíes 
Lye  6 cuartillos  2,5 maravedíes  15 maravedíes 
Total cost      895 maravedíes 
 
Sources: ADMSA. Legajos 51-4, 53-27. AMS. Section 1, Litigios, Folder 116, Number 
57. 
 
The olive oil was purchased at the  Postigo del Aceite  (Olive Oil Gate) of Seville. The 
reported price was the outcome of a weighted average of all olive oil acquisitions made 
during the preceding week: “those prices were used and distributed and each arroba cost 
140.5  maravedíes,  once the five maravedíes of  alcabala (a sale tax) were taken into 
consideration” (ADMSA.  Legajo  53-27). The cost of a  fanega of ashes was 40 
maravedíes and 10 more maravedíes were added for transportation and sundry costs. A 
carga (load) of wood cost 2 Reales, (68 maravedíes). One tenth of the carga was not 
used in the test, however, so the final cost was decreased by 7 maravedíes. Finally, the 
                                                 
4  1 quintal = 4 arrobas = 100 pounds = 128 cuartillos. 
5 1 ducado = 11 Reales = 375 maravedíes = 748 blancas = 1,496 nuevas. 
6 1 fanega = approximately 55.5 liters. 1 carga = 1 carretada = 8 fanegas = 96 almudes. IE Working Paper                                WP 16 / 03                                    27 / 10 / 2003 
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soap experts who ran the test decided on the consumption of lye and its concomitant 
cost.   
 
The soap produced for the test weighed 7 arrobas and 11 pounds (186 pounds); thus one 
arroba of olive oil produced 62 pounds of soap, rather than the usual 50-51 pounds, and 
this was regarded as a “high performance of olive oil” (alto rendimiento del aceite). It 
was therefore concluded that “this test has been more successful than any of the 
preceding ones” (ADMSA. Legajo 51-4). Although materials used in the production of a 
pound of soap cost 4.818  maravedíes, difficulties in handling decimals at the time 
required the experts to price it at “4 ½ maravedíes and one nueva”, or 4.75 maravedíes 
per pound (see Table 1). 
 
As the Duke’s representative, the manager of the RAS complained that soap production 
also involved other activities, and that their accompanying costs must be added to the 
cost of raw materials. The RAS manager’s complaints are listed in the memorandum 
summarized in Table 2, which contains the expected annual cost of the support 
activities. By dividing the estimate of support costs by the expected annual production of 
soap, the parties obtained the cost of support activities per pound of soap, which the 
Duke believed should be incorporated into the final cost of each pound.  Column 1 
depicts the claims of the RAS management about items and prices to be considered for 
cost purposes; whereas Column 2 reports the final decision of local government 
representatives.  
Table 2 
The 1525 Test: 




Proposal made by the 
Administrator of the RAS 
Decision made by the 
local government of 
Seville 
Repair and maintenance of cauldrons 
Purchase of ropes and related items 
12,000  8,000 
Preparation of cauldrons for the test  6,000  4,000 
Fabrication of sundry materials  10,000  6,000 
Taxes for ashes  7,500  7,275 
Rent that would be obtained if the building 
hosting the RAS were leased 
16,000  10,000 
Wages and food for the woman in charge of the 
office of weights 
6,000  6,000 
Food and wages for the six operators of the shop 
floor 
57,000  40,000 
Yearly taxes for soap turnover  120,000  40,000 
Returns on investment for materials and 
machinery 
300,000  20,000 
Salary of the administrator  40,000  30,000 
Total                171,275 
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Following is the rationale employed by RAS management and some of the 
counterarguments posed by local government:   
 
i.  If leased, the building that hosted the soap factory would have yielded an annual 
rent of 16,000 maravedíes, and this opportunity cost should be considered in the 
overall cost. 
ii.  The wages of the six shop-floor operators should be considered. Representatives 
of the local government verified, however, that five out of the six shop-floor 
employees were slaves. Therefore, they agreed to budget their living costs, but 
removed their suggested wages of 17,000 maravedíes/year.  
iii.  Investments made by the RAS in inventory and machinery would, in the opinion 
of the RAS management, have produced a 10% annual return, which would have 
amounted to 300,000 maravedíes. As shown in Table 2, this figure was rejected 
by the local government, which incorporated 20,000 maravedíes into the cost of 
soap.  
 
Accepted claims amounted to 171,175 maravedíes, which were allocated to the expected 
annual production of 417,000 pounds of soap. Non-production costs increased the cost 
per pound by 0.41  maravedíes.  The problems surrounding the handling of decimals, 
however, brought about the following consideration: “ … it seems that each pound costs 
one  nueva, which is one fourth of a  maravedí  as well as half a nueva, which is one-
eighth of a  maravedí …”.   The resulting figure was rounded down to 0.25 + 0.125 = 
0.375 rather than 0.41, which in absolute terms, meant a d ifference of 14,900 
maravedíes ( 171,275  – 156,275). The final report of the test stated: “… the remaining 
14,900 maravedíes are for the people [of Seville] because there is no way to allocate this 
amount to the pounds [of soap], and ultimately, this amount is consumed and are 
consumed [sic] by the people of Seville …”. Accordingly, the cost of a pound of soap 
was the result of the aggregation of raw material costs of 4.75 maravedíes (Table 1) and 
support costs of 0.375 (Table 2).  
 
The experts who carried  out the test admitted, however, that the result demonstrated an 
outstanding performance of olive oil. Under normal conditions, one  arroba of olive oil 
would have produced 50 to 51 pounds of soap, and if that result had occurred in this test, 
the cost of a  pound of soap would have been 6  maravedíes rather than the 4.75 
maravedíes  calculated from the test of January, 1525.  Consequently, they proposed to 
set the price of the soap at 6 maravedíes and pointed out that “the test was beneficial for 
the people of S eville and worth being taken as a reference for the future” (ADMSA. 
Legajo 53-27).  
 
THE ANTECEDENTS OF THE 1615 TESTS 
In 1602, a test was performed in which the price of the soap was set at 18 maravedíes 
(ADMSA. Legajo 53-17)
7. However, the Duke of Alcalá disagreed with this price and its 
supporting test and forwarded a memorandum of complaint to the King (ADMSA. 
Legajo  53-17). The Duke argued that the local government had not considered such 
                                                 
7 This increase in soap cost may be explained by the high inflation rates that Seville experienced during 
the 16
th century. IE Working Paper                                WP 16 / 03                                    27 / 10 / 2003 
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costs as the wages of salespeople that are instrumental to soap production and 
distribution and that they dismissed from the production cost the value of material 
wastage and theft. As a matter of principle, the Duke indicated that tests should be 
conducted with materials taken from the RAS inventories rather than n ewly purchased 
materials. The former, he stated, had a lower quality than the latter, to the extent that 
“stored materials are less and less strong as time goes by … [and] one arroba of olive oil 
cannot produce 48 to 50 pounds of soap because of the bad quality of many [raw] 
materials, like lye.” The Duke also reported that a pound of soap was being sold in the 
range of 20 to 32 maravedíes in nearby cities, requiring him to face financial losses. The 
arguments of the Duke must have appealed to the King, for he ordered the development 
of a test that was conducted in 1603. On the basis of this test, the price of soap was set at 
22  maravedíes. The parties agreed that such a price “shall not change in the future, and 
thus no consideration will be made of increases or decreases in costs of raw materials.” 
King Felipe III endorsed the agreement on September 3, 1603 (ADMSA. Legajo 53-19). 
 
In 1614, however, changes in the cost of raw materials required a test that resulted in 
another new pricing for soap: 30 maravedíes per pound (ADMSA. Legajo 53-27). The 
Judge of the Court of Seville, Mr. Juan del Castillo, stated that raw materials performed 
poorly in this test and endorsed the decision of the local government to set the price at 
24  maravedíes/pound. This decision prompted the Duke of Alcalá to forward a 
memorandum of complaints to the Royal Council. He claimed that many items had not 
been considered: the salaries of supervisors and foremen and the “interest of investments 
in materials, machinery and real estate” ( ADMSA.  Legajo  53-27). He asked the Royal 
Council to enforce the development of a new test, and, in the meantime, to set the price 
of soap at 33 maravedíes/pound. 
 
The Royal Council reacted on July 28, 1614 by ordering the development of a new test 
and enforcing a temporary price of 24  maravedíes/pound for soap. Although the Duke 
recognized the willingness of the local government to conduct the test, he disagreed with 
the intention of the regulator of using “highly selected and strong materials.” The Duke 
claimed that because the RAS made purchases “on a yearly basis, stored materials could 
not be as good or as strong as newly purchased materials” (ADMSA. Legajo 53-27). 
 
The local government, in turn, claimed that the present price of soap was convenient for 
the Duke. It was argued that the Duke’s correspondence with the Royal Council 
contained unsupportable claims that concealed his ultimate goal of delaying the 
development of a new test. Furthermore, the local government made an argument for not 
using RAS inventories in future tests: 
 
…many [of the inventories] were dried and corrupted because they were 
purchased for [the Duke’s] convenience. If the test were carried out with such 
materials, the soap price would be set at least at forty maravedíes per pound. The 
present procedure was backed by tradition and did not cause any hardship for the 
Duke; thus, none of his claims was justified because the City was careful to 
ascertain prices of lye, olive oil, and other materials from verifiable sources. 
These prices were then incorporated into the cost of soap in the same manner as it 
has been done over the distant past … (AMS. Section 4. Volume 1. Number 1)   
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The local government supported its contention by attaching the results of a recent, 
undated test that determined a unit cost of 15.83 maravedíes/pound. However, the price 
of the soap was set by the local government at 18 maravedíes/pound “to deter further 
delays and lawsuits” from the Duke (AMS. Section 4. Volume 1. Number 1). 
 
The Duke disagreed with the procedures that governed this test, however, and 
forwarded a new memorandum of complaints to the Royal Council. He claimed that the 
production and distribution processes for the soap involved more than fifty people and 
that the local government had considered the salaries of only twenty employees. The 
Duke also argued that “the RAS was housed in a huge building the maintenance of 
which required annual expenditures of at least 500  ducados  and the yearly rent of 
which, if leased, would have produced 1,000  ducados… [Lastly, I have made] 
considerable investments in inventory and machinery” (ADMSA.  Legajo  53-28).   Such 
considerations, the Duke added in his letter, were dismissed by the local government, 
which only admitted one-quarter of the maintenance costs. In short, the Duke asked the 
Royal Council to enforce the inclusion of these costs into the price of the soap. He also 
claimed that tests should 
 
…use inventories from the RAS [in the development of the test] and not pick up a 
number of singular and exclusive materials that are easy to use for a test but are not 
used in the normal running of the RAS. [The latter] required the supply of huge 
inventories to avoid materials shortages and equally implied that ashes and lime 
lessened their strength and died (sic) so that they produced half the soap that was 
obtained with materials that had been specifically purchased for the purpose 
(ADMSA. Legajo 53-28). 
 
These arguments appealed to the Royal Council. On April 9, 1615, it forwarded an order 
to the local government to set the price of soap at 22 maravedíes/pound and to conduct 
two tests: one to be run with RAS inventories and one to be conducted with newly 
purchased materials. These tests “should be conducted within the next forty days by 
[four] persons experienced i n the art of soap production, two [people] appointed by each 
side. The results of the tests should be reported to the Royal Council, which shall make 
a fair decision.” 
 
This order must have worried the Duke of Alcalá, because he reiterated his point about 
the huge purchases made by the RAS to guarantee the regular supply of soap to the City 
of Seville, saying that “there was no justification for conducting a test with newly 
purchased materials.” He also claimed that the soap price should be provisionally set at 
30 maravedíes rather than 22 maravedíes per pound.  
 
The local government also disagreed with the order of the Royal Council of April 9, 
1615, and reiterated its contention that a recent test determined the cost of soap to be 
15.83  maravedíes/pound.  Drawing on the results of the aforementioned test, the local 
government refused to set the price at 22 maravedíes, as ordered by the Royal Council 
(AMS. Section 4, Volume 1, Number 11). Instead, the local government asked for the 
authorization of the Royal Council to execute this price on a permanent basis, in view of 
the “maneuvers of the Duke to delay the test and thus to make profits from a convenient, 
current price of 24  maravedíes/pound.” Further, it was stated that the “Duke could 
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insurmountable damage to the City and its inhabitants.” The local government 
emphasized that all costs of raw materials and personnel had been taken into 
consideration and that the Duke attempted to include in the cost of soap production “the 
wages of some slaves who redeemed [in the tough working conditions of the RAS] their 
attempts to escape from their owners and for whom the Duke just provided food and 
lodging” (AMS. Section 4, Volume 1, Number 11). 
 
On July 3, 1615, the Royal Council issued an order that maintained the conditions stated 
in the April 9 document, and appointed Mr. Juan del Castillo, a judge of the Court of 
Seville, as supervisor of the two tests. These conditions were slightly modified by an 
order of September 12, 1615, which appointed Mr. Pedro Maldonado, a fellow judge of 
the Court of Seville, as a co-supervisor of the tests. The judges, in turn, appointed Mr. 
Juan Bautista de Herrera,  Contador (Accountant) of the Sacred Church of Seville to 
keep records of the tests and to prepare a final report (ADMSA. Legajo 53-28; AMS. 
Section 1, Litigios, Folder 116, Number 57). 
 
THE 1615 TESTS 
The Accountant first reported on the way in which the cost of materials was calculated: 
… purchased materials are priced as shown in the attached receipts. Materials taken 
from the RAS are valued at their apparent purchase prices according to the certifications 
delivered by management … (ADMSA. Legajo 53-28). 
 
The prices of materials consumed for both tests are summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3 
The 1615 Tests:  




Test made with newly purchased materials  Test made with materials taken from the 
RAS inventories 
  Consumption  Unit Cost  Total Cost  Consumption  Unit Cost  Total Cost 
























































TOTAL      1,765.24 
maravedíes 
    1,193.43 
maravedíes 
 
Source: ADMSA. Legajo 53-28. 
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For the test undertaken with the newly purchased materials, the Accountant provided a 
number of clarifications. First, it was necessary to buy 12  fanegas  of ashes, at 5 
Reales/fanega, for a total cost of 2,040 maravedíes. Transportation costs were 24 Reales 
(816  maravedíes), and a 10% tax was added to the resulting amount. The total cost of 
ashes, therefore, was 3,060 maravedíes, and the unit cost was 255 maravedíes/fanega, 
although only 3.5 fanegas of the 12 fanegas of ashes were actually consumed.  
 
Second, the experts acquired 12  fanegas  of lime, the total cost of which was 510 
maravedíes. With taxes, the final cost of lime was increased by 51 maravedíes and was 
further increased by the rental cost of a horse to transport it (153 maravedíes), bringing 
the total cost of lime to 1,598 maravedíes and the unit cost to 133.166 maravedíes. The 
actual consumption of lime was 2 of the 12 fanegas acquired.  
 
Third, 8 quintales of wood were purchased for both tests, at a cost of 612 maravedíes. 
Because the transportation cost of wood was 102 maravedíes the total cost of wood was 
714 maravedíes and the unit cost was 89 
3/12 maravedíes/quintal. 
 
Consumption of wood for this test was written on the left-hand margin of the paper, and 
the following data were provided: 
 
Wood delivered for the test    12 arrobas and 10 pounds 
Wood returned from the test      5 arrobas and   2 pounds 
Wood consumed in the test      7 arrobas and   8 pounds 
 
Fourth, 2 fanegas of olive oil greaves
8, with a unit price of 102 maravedíes/fanega, were 
purchased for both tests, and transportation costs amounted to 68 maravedíes. Thus the 
overall total for olive  oil greaves was 272  maravedíes and the unit cost to 136 
maravedíes/fanega.  Again, the Accountant recorded the consumption of olive oil 
greaves for this test: 
 
Olive greaves delivered for the test    12 almudes 
Olive greaves returned from the test      6 almudes  
Olive greaves consumed in the test      6 almudes  
 
Sixth, the unit cost of olive oil was determined by calculating the weighted average of all 
purchases made between October 10 and November 10, as shown in receipts requested 
from the supervisor of the Olive Oil Gate. Twelve different prices were provided, 
totaling 3,979.5  maravedíes,  which, after adding the appropriate taxes, yielded a unit 
cost of 375 
1/12 maravedíes/arroba (ADMSA. Legajo 53-28). 
 
In a similar vein, the test that used materials from the RAS inventory required a number 
of clarifications by the Accountant. First, the cost of ashes was determined upon the 
certification provided by the RAS Accountant. The cost was 5 Reales/fanega plus a 10% 
alcabala (sales tax), for a total unit cost of 187 maravedíes.  
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Second, information about the cost of lime was gathered from the accounting books of 
the RAS, which revealed the purchase of 18  carretadas for 25½  ducados. With the 
addition of taxes, the total cost became 28 ducados (10,500 maravedíes), which in turn 
brought the unit cost of lime to 72
11/12 maravedíes/fanega.  
 
Third, wood had the same price for both tests, as noted above. Wood consumption for 
this test was recorded as follows: 
 
Wood delivered for the test      8 arrobas and 17 pounds 
Wood returned from the test      5 arrobas and 15 pounds 
Wood consumed in the test      3 arrobas and   2 pounds 
 
Fourth, oil greaves were also purchased for both tests and the consumption was recorded 
as follows: 
 
Olive greaves delivered for the test    12 almudes 
Olive greaves returned from the test    10 almudes and 2 fourths 
Olive greaves consumed in the test      1   almud  and 2 fourths 
 
Fifth, receipts issued by the supervisor of the Olive Oil Gate were used to determine the 
cost of olive oil. These receipts covered the period from September 10 to October 10, 
1615. A calculation of the weighted average price of olive oil yielded a unit cost of 
335
3/12 maravedíes, for a total cost of 386.25 maravedíes/arroba, including taxes. 
 
Drawing on these data, the cost of a pound of olive oil specifically purchased for the test 
was calculated to include the cost of transportation (32.66 maravedíes per pound of olive 
oil) and to exclude the cost of transportation (24.4166 maravedíes/pound). The test using 
materials from the RAS inventory, on the other hand, produced a unit cost of 27.66 
maravedíes/pound (ADMSA.  Legajo 53-28). Although this calculation did not 
encompass any of the administration costs that constituted a permanent matter of 
concern for RAS, the parties agreed that administration costs amounted to 10 million 
maravedíes per year, yielding a total cost of 37.66 maravedíes per pound for the finished 
soap. In short, the test run with materials taken from the RAS inventories produced a 
total cost for soap that was 5  maravedíes higher than the test run with materials 
purchased specifically for the purpose. Regrettably, our search of the archives did not 
reveal the final decision – the price at which soap was set after the 1615 tests. 
 
THE 1640-1692 PERIOD 
In 1640, Mr. Antonio de la Cerda, Duke of  Medinaceli, married the heiress of the 
Dukedom of Alcalá and assumed the royal privilege of making and distributing soap to 
the City of Seville and its area of influence. On January 18, 1643, the parties agreed to 
set the price of soap at 30 maravedíes for the next four years and at 32 maravedíes for 
the four subsequent years. King Felipe IV endorsed this agreement on November 2, 
1643 (ADMSA.  Legajo  53-38; AMS. Section 4, Volume 4, Number 15), subject to 
several conditions. 1) These prices were not to be contingent upon the price of olive oil. 
                                                                                                                                                
8 Olive oil greaves – byproducts in the production of olive oil – were used, for their corrosive 
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2) The soap market was regulated by royal privilege, and the price of soap would 
therefore be revised if changes occurred in the terms of the privilege. 3) Quality 
conditions for soap (i.e., color, tightness) and olive oil performance (i.e., 52 pounds per 
arroba  of olive oil) were established. 4) A supply of soap would be provided to 14 
shops, which must be opened 24 hours a day. The location of the shops was also 
negotiated, and it included the various neighborhoods of Seville and its area of 
influence. 5) Trade at the shops must be restricted to bread, olive oil, soap, and coal. 
Weighing devices would have to be cleaned and sealed, and the seal was to be checked 
by a City supervisor every four months. 6) The price of the soap would have to be 
permanently displayed. 
 
In spite of this agreement, conflicts between the local government and the Duke  of 
Medinaceli occurred during the second half of the 17
th century, centering on bitter 
arguments about the procedures that governed the tests and determined the cost of soap. 
As the Duke of  Medinaceli wrote in an internal memorandum to the management of the 
RAS about issues to be considered during the development of the tests: 
 
First, we have to determine the cost of the materials in each of the tests
9. We should 
calculate and add all the corresponding taxes as well as all costs legitimated by extant 
documents. 
Second, we have to discover the sources of differences between the two tests – that is, 
whether they correspond to taxes or any other item – and all calculations should be made 
very clearly and separately. 
Third, we have to continually update our accounting books and check if there is anything 
left. 
Fourth, the whole process has to be monitored to the letter ( a la letra, in detail). 
Otherwise, it is impossible to discern the price of the items and the level of consumption 
(ADMSA. Legajo 55-4).  
 
On December 6, 1672 the King answered the Duke’s complaints about some items in the 
cost of soap production being ignored, and ordered a test that “should comprise all costs 
and rights so that the price reflects them all” (ADMSA.  Legajo  55-13). The local 
government, however, did not obey this order on the grounds that it had the right to set 
the price of soap and to establish the governing procedure of the tests. 
 
On May 19, 1692, the local government held a plenary session to set the price of soap at 
28  maravedíes. The Duke of  Medinaceli disagreed with this decision and forwarded a 
memorandum of complaint to the King (ADMSA.  Legajo  55-4; AMS. Section 4, 
Volume 1, Number 16). His flamboyant memorandum depicted errors in the 
development of the supporting test and  provided several examples of the many 
administration costs not included in the production cost. Of interest for this paper is the 
Duke’s complaint about the omission of the priest’s salary: 
 
 [To guarantee the supply of soap to the City of Seville, the RAS] is obliged to operate 
on Sundays. This forces me to provide a Sunday mass service for foremen and operators, 
because they are naked while running production and cannot leave the premises in such 
a condition (ADMSA. Legajo 55-4). 
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The Duke also claimed that the local government dismissed his demands to set “my 
earnings as a constitutive part of price.” In particular, he argued: 
 
 [The local government] does not admit any earning to me as a purveyor, as it has done 
in the past, and as it is currently done in the cities of Cádiz and Xerez. Furthermore, it 
has recognized an additional 8 per cent to prevent the deterioration of the materials and 
the stored soap. The contention that spreads throughout the City is that if such expense is 
considered, then there will be no allowance for earnings. This lacks support [because] 
what is expense is not earnings, and earnings cannot be denied to the purveyor. Moreover, 
the privilege will be useless if I cannot profit from it” (ADMSA. Legajo 55-4). 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Historical research has enhanced our knowledge of the role of cost accounting in firms 
that are operating in competitive markets. For example, those under the Neoclassical 
Economics School have found that increasing competition slashed the profit margins of 
firms around the time of the British Industrial Revolution and in 19
th century USA, 
motivating the deployment of cost accounting calculations as companies sought 
opportunities for cost improvements (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). Yet we still have 
much to learn about the role of cost accounting in the regulated markets that dominated 
many Southern European economies near the end of the Middle Ages and the during 
Renaissance and the extent to which it was instrumental in the deployment of public 
policy by authorities. In the City of Seville, for example, bricks (AMS. Section 3, 
Volume 13, Number 15), fish (AMS. Section 4, Volume 29, Number 16), and olive oil 
(AMS. Section 4, Volume 4, Number 15)
10 were three items in the long list of goods that 
operated under stiff market regulations. In this study, we examined the case of the soap 
production and distribution monopoly in the City of Seville – a monopoly granted by the 
King of Castille to the Duke of Alcalá in 1423, while placing the right and responsibility 
of the pricing decision in the hands of the local government. Over the centuries, the 
Duke of Alcalá and the local government deployed tests that reproduced the soap 
production process and designed a complex system of cost calculations to track the real 
cost of soap as a basis for price negotiations.  
 
Discussion from the perspective of institutional sociology 
For the soap tests to be considered an institution required the regular development of that 
practice as well as the conferral of external support to the testers (Scott and Meyer, 
1983: 149). It appears that the parties developed tests at least as early as 1520 (González 
Moreno, 1975: 92), and again in 1525 (ADMSA. Legajo 51-4; AMS. Section 1, Litigios, 
Folder 116, Number 57), 1602 (ADMSA. Legajo 53-17), 1603 (ADMSA. Legajo 53-
19), 1614a (ADMSA. Legajo 53-27), 1614b (AMS. Section 4, Volume 1, Number 11), 
1615 (ADMSA. Legajo 53-28; AMS. Section 1, Litigios, Folder 116, Number 57), 1643 
(ADMSA.  Legajo  53-38; AMS. Section 4, Volume 4, Number 15), 1672 (ADMSA. 
Legajo 55-13), 1675 (ADMSA. Legajo 55-13), and 1692 (ADMSA. Legajo 55-4, AMS. 
Section 4, Volume 1, Number 16). We were able to find records of two tests dating back 
to 1520 and 1525, no evidence for the period 1525-1602, and support for the 
development of nine tests during the 17
th century.  
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Other primary sources suggest that the development of tests constituted a regular activity 
of the parties. For example, the report that certified the 1675 test stated in its preamble: 
“… testing of the product of the almonas, or soap factories, is an operation that has been 
accomplished from the 15
th century …” (ADMSA. Legajo 55-13). In a similar vein, in its 
report to the Royal Council of 1614, the local government referred to the procedures that 
ruled the tests as practices “backed by tradition” (AMS. Section 4. Volume 1. Number 1), 
and the tests were regarded as operations that “have been done in the distant past” 
(Ibidem). It is important to note that although surviving records reveal only four tests 
prior to 1614 (1520, 1525, 1602, and 1603), references to “tradition” and the “distant 
past” were made in 1614 – an indication that there may be missing records in the archives 
that would have shown us enough tests occurring in the distant past to constitute 
tradition.  
 
In sum, the development of soap tests were governed by customary, non-written 
traditions during a period that lasted at least from 1520 to 1692 and, arguably, on a 
regular basis. We contend that these data provide support for the requirement of “usual” 
practice that institutional sociologists attribute to the notion of “institution” (Scott and 
Meyer, 1983: 149; Scott, 2001).” 
 
Institutions are distinguished by investing the parties with support before external 
constituents (Scott, 2001). According to one document, the Royal Council enacted a 
decree on April 9, 1615 that obliged the local government to set the price of soap at 30 
maravedíes.  Nevertheless, the local government denied the implementation of the royal 
decree because a recent test had determined t he cost of soap to be 15.83 
maravedíes/pound (AMS. Section 4, Volume 1, Number 11), a decision that should be 
examined in the context of a political regime that differs from present-day democracies. 
As noted above, Spain was ruled during our observation period by the absolutist 
monarchy of the Habsburgs (Kamen, 1997). It is difficult to imagine that a local 
government would disobey the order of an absolute monarch unless its decision was 
supported by a higher authority. Perhaps test results could not be openly challenged by 
any external party  – even by an absolute king. Thus the development of tests and their 
accompanying cost calculations may have invested the parties with support before 
powerful constituents like the absolute monarchy, suggesting that the  tests complied 
with the requirement of social endorsement that characterizes institutions (Scott, 2001).  
 
The credibility of the tests was reinforced by their technical appearance and by their 
association with external experts (Richardson, 1987; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988: 6) 
who were independent from the parties (e.g., soap masters brought from other cities), 
supervised by local judges, and certified by an accountant of the Catholic Church. 
Importantly, data incorporated into cost calculations were certified either by suppliers of 
raw materials or by the accounting records of the RAS. The parties drew on this 
technical imagery of accounting calculations in support of their claims. The Duke, for 
example, relied on a technical discourse to channel his complaints against specific 
elements of the tests. He demanded that they be conducted with materials from the RAS 
inventory in order to reproduce standard conditions of soap production and he insisted 
that such items as the priest’s salary (ADMSA. Legajo 55-4; AMS. Section 4, Volume 1, IE Working Paper                                WP 16 / 03                                    27 / 10 / 2003 
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Number 16) and the opportunity costs for lost rent to the RAS (ADMSA. Legajo 51-4) 
be included in the total cost of a pound of soap.  
 
Institutional sociologists predict that individuals and organizations will attempt to create 
an environment in which they can enact their claims behind a façade of technical 
arguments (see, e.g., Dacin  et al., 2002).  The Duke supported this position when he 
enacted the practice of permanent lobbying before the King in order to create new 
legitimating beliefs (Suchman, 1995). Interesting for our purposes is the fact that the 
latitude exhibited by the Duke to manipulate the terms of the tests was contingent upon 
his political influence in the Royal House (Oliver, 1991). Thus the King’s support for the 
inclusion of “…  all costs and rights” (ADMSA.  Legajo  55-4, emphasis added) in the 
cost of soap had to wait until 1672, when the powerful Dukedom of Medinaceli assumed 
the management of RAS. The political influence of the Dukedom of Medinaceli at that 
time may be signaled by the Duke’s appointment on February 22, 1680 as Prime 
Minister of Spain. Paraphrasing Burchell  et al. (1980: 17), we contend that cost 
accounting became one of the mechanisms around which private versus public interests 
were negotiated. The apparent acceptance of the tests by the parties in the public domain 
was accompanied by active agency to shape the tests at the convenience of the Duke. 
 
Finally, in accordance with predictions of institutional sociologists (Meyer and Rowan, 
1977),  the legitimizing effects of the tests outweighed their intended, economic purposes 
of price setting (Carruthers, 1995). In practice, cost calculations became a rhetorical 
element in arriving at a price for soap. As we have seen, the price-setting decision did 
not necessarily draw upon the outcome of the tests. In the 1525 test, for example, the 
production cost was 5.125 maravedíes, but the price was set at 6 maravedíes because of 
the strong performance of olive oil in the test (ADMSA.  Legajo  51-4). In 1614, the 
production cost that resulted from the test was 30 maravedíes, but the price was set at 24 
maravedíes because of the “poor quality” of the materials (ADMSA. Legajo 53-19). In 
the second test conducted in 1614, on the other hand, the cost of producing the soap was 
15.83  maravedíes, but the price was set at 18 maravedíes “to deter further delays and 
lawsuits [from the Duke]” (ADMSA. Legajo 53-19). In short, in spite of the appearance 
of conformity that the parties exhibited towards the tests and their r eliance on technical 
judgments, the final price was largely the outcome of non-technical considerations. 
 
Discussion from the perspective of historical research in management accounting 
The development of soap tests in 16th and 17th century Seville provides some insights 
into the evolution of the management of public affairs during this observation period. As 
noted above, the doctrine of the Schoolmen inspired the deployment of regulated 
markets in Spain and its overseas colonies. As intended, regulated markets ensured a 
“just price”, which would ultimately protect the poor (De Roover, 1967). In the case of 
the 1525 soap monopoly, the notion of a “just price” was operationalized into what 
present-day terminology would label a “rate-of-return regulation” (Laffont and Tirole, 
1993). The price of a public good equalled its average cost, which implied that the soap 
monopolist seemingly adopted the role of a public servant with marginal or no financial 
goals and with an interest in providing service to the people of Seville. This situation is 
illustrated by the handling of decimals in the test of 1525; figures were rounded down to 
benefit the people of Seville irrespective of financial implications for the Duke 
(ADMSA. Legajo 53-27).  
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In contrast, the end of our  observation period in 1692 depicts a different situation. 
Drawing on the logic of cost accounting calculations, the Duke claimed his right to 
profit from the monopoly: “… what is expense is not earnings, and earnings cannot be 
denied to the purveyor. Moreover, the privilege will be useless if I cannot profit from it” 
(ADMSA.  Legajo 55-4). In other words, the Duke demanded what in present-day 
terminology would be called “rate-of-return regulation” with a limited allowance for 
profits or a “price cap”  – a soap price that allowed for private profits with future  
updates, irrespective of increases in the cost of resources in the production of soap 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Such rationale for price updates was used in 1603 (ADMSA. 
Legajo  53-19), and especially in 1643, when price increases were set for the next three 
years irrespective of changes in the cost of raw materials or other resources (ADMSA. 
Legajo 53-38. AMS. Section 4, Volume 4, Number 15). Although the Duke did not 
bother to record his financial goals in writing, he was obviously aware of some social 
resistance to profit-making from the supply of a public good: “… the contention that 
spreads the City is that if such expense is considered, there will be no allowance for 
earnings” (ADMSA. Legajo 55-4). 
 
Archival evidence from the 15
th to 17
th century allowed us to address the development of 
soap production testing from the perspectives of the two parties involved – the Dukedom 
of Alcalá and the local government of Seville  – and to interpret their correspondence 
with the King. This research allows us  to report on several findings about cost 
accounting in an early regulated market. 1) There is written documentation available 
about Rennaisance cost accounting systems, featuring targets, predictions, and  results. 2) 
Using the languae of Ezzamel and Hoskins (2002, accounting was used in this early 
period as a creator of value. 3) The extensive data collected for the soap production 
testing did not appear to strongly influence decision making.  4) Although a wide variety 
of sophisticated cost accounting techniques were employed during this peirod, they 
appear not to have been incorporated into the disciplinary nexus of managemen practices 
or to be utilized in the meausrement of human performance.  The following section 
summarizes of each of these findings. 
 
First, our evidence provides support for the contention that early cost management 
systems attempted to turn performance into writing and, by doing so, initiated practices 
in which targets and results were extrapolated into the future (Hoskin and Macve, 1994; 
Ezzamel, 1994, 1997). The use of writing is exemplified by the careful account of tests 
kept by the Accountant of the Catholic Church. In a similar vein, extrapolation of results 
into the future is illustrated by the concluding reminder of the 1515 test, which stated 
that performance “was beneficial for the people of Seville and worth being taken as a 
reference for the future” (ADMSA. Legajo 51-4; AMS. Section 1, Litigios, Folder 116, 
Number 57; emphasis added). Further, the Agreement of 1643 between the RAS and the 
local government, drew upon an established standard (ADMSA.  Legajo 53-38; AMS. 
Section 4, Volume 4, Number 15) that was incorporated into the control procedures of 
the RAS to assume a performance of 52 pounds of soap per arroba of olive oil. 
 
Second, the parties deployed a complex system of cost calculations that attached values 
to objects or, as Ezzamel and Hoskin (2002) would say, accounting was used as a creator 
of value. Cost calculations  were implemented by the RAS  – a small-sized firm  – 
providing support for Boyns and Edwards’ (1997:22) contention that “there is no reason 
why,  a priori, one should expect a link between the development of large-scale business IE Working Paper                                WP 16 / 03                                    27 / 10 / 2003 
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and that of management accounting.” Admittedly, some cost allocations were relatively 
straightforward. For example, the cost of raw materials was calculated through the 
aggregation of purchase and transportation costs plus corresponding taxes. Conversely, 
other calculations involved a  deep understanding of production costing. For example, 
administration and non-production costs were allocated to soap costs as a function of the 
annual production schedule of the RAS, which in turn required a precise forecasting of 
soap demand. Furthermore, the RAS argued that present investments in inventories and 
machinery could have been earning a 10% interest rate and requested that this factor be 
incorporated into the production cost (ADMSA.  Legajo 51-4). Similarly, the RAS 
asserted that alternative leasing of the buildings that housed the factory would provide 
the Duke with rents that should be included in the cost of the product. The parties also 
determined the standard performance of olive oil, which became a crucial element in the 
proper calculation of the cost of soap. In short, such calculations anticipated the 
utilization of standards based on expectations from prior results some centuries before 
the advent of scientific management (Fleischman and Tyson, 1998: 93). 
 
Taken together, these first two findings reveal the development of forms of cost-keeping 
practices that were not double-entry based (Miller and Napier, 1993). They also signaled 
the expertise of the RAS in ascertaining the constitutive elements of product costing and, 
ultimately, the notion of a firm’s profit. Such understanding was eloquently framed as a 
purely technical discourse that attempted to persuade the King and the local government 
about the elements that should be incorporated into the costs of soap production 
(Carruthers, 1995). We observed stability in the cost categories, however, as well as in 
the soap production technology used during our period of study. 
 
Third, a debatable issue in historical management accounting research is the extent to 
which such data informed managerial decision-making (i.e., Hoskin and Macve, 2000). 
Regrettably, there is no available 16
th and 17
th century evidence for proper comparison 
purposes. Our findings suggest that the RAS did not use cost data from the tests for 
regular managerial decision making, with the exception of the overall understanding 
outlined in the 1643 agreement that an  arroba of olive oil should produce 52 pounds of 
soap (ADMSA. Legajo 53-38; AMS. Section 4, Volume 4, Number 15) and in the 1525 
test (ADMSA.  Legajo  51-4; AMS. Section 1,  Litigios, Folder 116, Number 57). As 
noted above, this situation may have been caused by the system of rate-of-return/price 
cap regulation that characterized price setting by the local government of Seville. On the 
one hand, such results are similar to those found by Boyns and Edwards (1997a, 1997b), 
who reported little development of costing information in management decision making 
in 19
th century UK. On the other hand, such results depart from those reported by 
Carmona et al. (1997, 2002), who found that cost data were used in managerial decision 
making in the Royal Tobacco Factory of Seville in the 18
th century. Thus, our findings 
also deviate from those of Tyson (1998), who reported the use of cost data in business 
decision making in US textile mills of the early 19
th century. 
 
Finally, our findings show no indication of accounting having been incorporated into the 
disciplinary nexus of management practices (Ezzamel, Hoskin and Macve, 1990), and 
thus no shift has been found to extend standards of  raw materials to measure human 
performance (Hoskin and Macve, 2000). We contend that the absence of cost data on 
human performance might be attributed to the extensive use of slaves in shop floor 
operations (ADMSA. Legajo 51-4). We have also detected the u se of a wide variety of IE Working Paper                                WP 16 / 03                                    27 / 10 / 2003 
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complex cost accounting techniques during our observation period  – a period that has 
been widely neglected by management accounting historians. These techniques involved 
issues that, expressed in present-day terminology, comprised s tandards of raw material 
consumption (e.g., olive oil), production capacity (i.e., annual estimation of the RAS 
turnover), calculation of wastage (i.e., raw materials in the tests), and opportunity costs 
(i.e., factory building and investment in inventory  and machinery). It is  remarkable that 




In this study, we have examined the systems of cost calculations governing the 
development of soap tests  in the regulated market that characterized the economy of the 
City of Seville between the 15
th and 17
th centuries. Other goods such as bricks, olive oil 
and fish were subjected to stiff regulations in the City of Seville, however, at least 
during a large portion of this period. Surviving records for these goods are not well 
preserved, which poses research problems. Yet there were other places where regulated 
markets operated as a dominant economic form:  in Southern Europe, for instance, and 
in Latin America during the Renaissance. Investigations on the role of cost calculations 
in price setting would enhance an understanding of the extent to which cost accounting 
practices mediated the undertakings of public sector agencies and the interface between 
the state and private sectors (i.e., Hoskin and Macve, 2000; Carmona and Macías, 2001), 
as well as the relationship between the state and such powerful constituents as the 
knighthood and the Catholic Church. In a similar vein, we consider a promising research 
area to be the historical examination of the state’s efforts to stress the imagery of 
objectivity of cost data in order to garner public endorsement  – to trace the history of 
accounting as a form of rhetoric in public sector contexts. Finally, investigation of cost 
accounting practices in the price setting decision in present-day, deregulated markets 
(i.e., US energy) and privatized sectors (i.e., the UK water supply in 1989) may also 
highlight the connections between the technical and the discursive natures of 
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